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Itai Ashlagi
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Year
Unbalanced random matching markets: The stark effect of competition
I Ashlagi, Y Kanoria, JD Leshno
Journal of Political Economy 125 (1), 69-98, 2017
189*2017
Free riding and participation in large scale, multi‐hospital kidney exchange
I Ashlagi, AE Roth
Theoretical Economics 9 (3), 817-863, 2014
178*2014
Nonsimultaneous chains and dominos in kidney‐paired donation—Revisited
I Ashlagi, DS Gilchrist, AE Roth, MA Rees
American Journal of transplantation 11 (5), 984-994, 2011
1772011
Efficient dynamic barter exchange
R Anderson, I Ashlagi, D Gamarnik, Y Kanoria
Operations Research 65 (6), 1446-1459, 2017
156*2017
Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
I Ashlagi, F Fischer, IA Kash, AD Procaccia
Games and Economic Behavior 91, 284-296, 2015
153*2015
Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem
R Anderson, I Ashlagi, D Gamarnik, AE Roth
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112 (3), 663-668, 2015
1292015
Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
I Ashlagi, M Braverman, A Hassidim
Operations Research 62 (4), 713-732, 2014
128*2014
Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
I Ashlagi, YA Gonczarowski
Journal of Economic Theory 177, 405-425, 2018
100*2018
Maximum weight online matching with deadlines
I Ashlagi, M Burq, C Dutta, P Jaillet, A Saberi, C Sholley
arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.03526, 2018
99*2018
Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools
I Ashlagi, P Jaillet, VH Manshadi
arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.3509, 2013
882013
The need for (long) chains in kidney exchange
I Ashlagi, D Gamarnik, MA Rees, AE Roth
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012
882012
Optimal allocation without money: An engineering approach
I Ashlagi, P Shi
Management Science 62 (4), 1078-1097, 2016
822016
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms
I Ashlagi, S Dobzinski, R Lavi
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 169-176, 2009
812009
Equilibrium allocations under alternative waitlist designs: Evidence from deceased donor kidneys
N Agarwal, I Ashlagi, MA Rees, P Somaini, D Waldinger
Econometrica 89 (1), 37-76, 2021
80*2021
Monotonicity and implementability
I Ashlagi, M Braverman, A Hassidim, D Monderer
Econometrica 78 (5), 1749-1772, 2010
792010
Mediators in position auctions
I Ashlagi, D Monderer, M Tennenholtz
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 279-287, 2007
782007
New challenges in multihospital kidney exchange
I Ashlagi, AE Roth
American Economic Review 102 (3), 354-59, 2012
762012
Position auctions with budgets: Existence and uniqueness
I Ashlagi, M Braverman, A Hassidim, R Lavi, M Tennenholtz
Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
722010
Market failure in kidney exchange
N Agarwal, I Ashlagi, E Azevedo, CR Featherstone, ÷ Karaduman
American Economic Review 109 (11), 4026-70, 2019
692019
Resource selection games with unknown number of players
I Ashlagi, D Monderer, M Tennenholtz
Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents†…, 2006
692006
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Articles 1–20